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Joseph R. Smallwood, the man who presided over Newfoundland as its fi rst premier from 
1949 to 1972, never seemed to tire of listing the changes in Newfoundland society that had 
occurred since Confederation.1  From counting the numbers of indoor toilets in Newfoundland 
schools, to the massive scale of development at the hydro-electric project at Churchill Falls, 
the continual reminders of these changes became integral to Smallwood’s public persona.2
While Smallwood had clear political motivations for regaling the electorate with the changes 
that had occurred since Confederation, no one can deny that the fi rst two decades after 1949 
did bring some fundamental transformations to Newfoundland.  Politically, the former British 
colony underwent the adjustment of becoming a province of Canada, after having given up 
Responsible Government in the 1930s for Commission of Government.  Becoming a part of 
Canada, in some ways, meant changes in people’s relationship to the state, as the people of 
Newfoundland felt the effects of the emergence of the Canadian “welfare state” emerging after 
World War II.  While the economic developments in Newfoundland and Labrador were never 
as far-reaching and complete as Smallwood and many of the political planners had hoped, the 
1950s and 1960s did see Newfoundland drawn more closely into a North American industrial 
economy, particularly in the fi shery, forest products, mining and energy.  Newfoundland 
experienced profound changes, as social welfare programs, education, roads, communications, 
and utilities became a part of the lives of its inhabitants.  Indeed, fi nding a way to provide 
all these new services to the hundreds of small, primarily fi shing communities became a 
major occupation with provincial governments in this period, and both federal and provincial 
governments tried to encourage consolidation and centralization of rural communities through 
various resettlement plans.  Despite these transformations and a rich resource base, however, 
the vision for an economically prosperous Newfoundland promised by Smallwood never quite 
materialized. 
This paper will examine the literature on Newfoundland from Confederation to 1972, 
focussing on the political, social and economic history of the province.  In particular, it will 
consider scholars’ explanations for Newfoundland’s position as a “have not” province, and 
their evaluations of attempts by both the federal and provincial governments to alleviate social 
and economic problems in the region.  It will begin by providing an overview of the history of 
the period, outlining the political background to Newfoundland’s entry to Confederation, the 
economic transitions, social change, and the uneven results of two decades of “development.” 
Then, this paper will look at writing on the political history of this period, looking at the 
political culture and the fi gure of Smallwood in these critical years.  As well, it will discuss 
federal-provincial relations in the fi rst decade after Confederation, as Newfoundland made the 
transition to a province of Canada.  After considering the political history of Newfoundland, 
this paper will then look more broadly at writing on social and economic conditions in 
the province and the various development strategies employed by federal and provincial 
governments.  Finally, this paper will examine the writing on development plans and policies 
for fi sheries in Newfoundland in this period, and their impact on the men and women who 
continued to depend on the sea for their livelihood .
The fi rst half of the 20th century was a particularly turbulent period in Newfoundland’s 
political life.3  Crises in the fi shing economy, the heavy burden of debt left after World War 
I, and largely unsuccessful attempts at bringing industrial development to Newfoundland 
through railway ventures proved devastating to an already unstable political system.4  After 
the onset of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the former colony was close to bankruptcy, 
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and the Liberal government of Richard Squires faced accusations of corruption and fi nancial-
wrongdoings.  Squires lost the 1932 election to Frederick Alderdice, of the newly-formed 
United Newfoundland Party.  Alderdice agreed to a Royal Commission to examine the political 
and economic problems of the country.  The 1933 “Amulree Report” recommended a “rest” 
from politics and the creation of an appointed Commission of Government to administer the 
affairs of Newfoundland until the economic crisis was resolved.5   In 1934, a six-member 
Commission of Government, comprised of mainly career civil servants and administrators from 
Britain and Newfoundland was appointed to govern the troubled country.  This Commission 
of Government remained in place until 1949, when Newfoundland became a province of 
Canada.
Political life after Confederation was no less diffi cult, as responsible government was 
restored and Newfoundland settled into the federal framework as a province of Canada.  The 
premier, Joseph R. Smallwood, dominated political life in this period, as he translated his folksy, 
charismatic powers of persuasion into a political machine that won six consecutive provincial 
elections.  Despite his electoral success, Smallwood and his governing Liberals faced the 
diffi cult task of trying to provide services and employment to the province’s rural population. 
Smallwood embarked on several highly-publicized campaigns to develop the economy in 
these years, the fi rst of which was the creation of a series of light industry manufacturing 
companies in the early 1950s.6  Most of these fi rms, established with European entrepreneurs 
and technology, but with funds from Newfoundland, had failed by the mid-1950s.  Not fazed 
by the setback, Smallwood continued to launch major resource development projects, carried 
out largely by capital interests from outside the province.7  Relying on outside capital certainly 
had its benefi ts for Smallwood, who had limited resources to invest in economic development. 
For the outside developers, they received access to the resources, plus a cheap supply of labour 
– the people of Newfoundland.  These projects, included the iron-ore mine in Labrador, the 
Churchill Falls hydro-electric development, the Bay d’Espoir Generating Station  and the 
Stephenville Liner Board Mill.8  One of the most controversial and costly projects of the early 
1970s was an oil refi nery at Come-by-Chance built by businessman John Shaheen, which 
received fi nancial assistance from both the federal and provincial governments.  The refi nery, 
like the Stephenville Liner Board Mill and several other projects, were fi nancial failures. 
While in the short term, people from Newfoundland benefi ted from the construction jobs these 
projects provided, the long-term return on the resources was limited.  Indeed, the developers of 
the iron ore operations in Labrador and the Churchill Falls hydro-electric project continue to 
profi t from the resources, decades after the last construction job ended.
These industrial projects initiated by Smallwood were representative of the broader transition 
occurring in the Newfoundland economy after Confederation.  Historically, Newfoundland’s 
economy was based on the rich resources of Atlantic cod that inhabited the large continental 
self off the coast of the island and Labrador.9  Since the early nineteenth century, most of the 
fi sh was caught by inshore fi shing people living in the hundreds of outports along the coastline 
of the island and Labrador.  A smaller part of the fi shing population was engaged in offshore 
“Banks” fi sheries, based in the ice-free ports of the south coast of the island and St. John’s. 
Most of the fi sh was dried and salted, and sold in markets of southern Europe, the West Indies 
and South America.  Far from being completely dependent on a single resource, however, 
fi shing families made use of a variety of local resources such as wild game, seabirds, seals, 
whales, wild berries, and household gardens to supply their members with sustenance.  During 
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World War II, a new, industrial sector based on frozen fi sh emerged, providing employment 
in processing plants and on offshore fi shing trawlers.  While the majority of fi shing people 
remained attached to the small-boat, inshore fi shery, the saltfi sh sector gradually declined, as 
did local reliance on merchant credit, which had been the foundation of the inshore saltfi sh 
sector.
Formal economic activity outside the fi shery, however, was limited.  St. John’s had a 
small manufacturing sector, providing products for local consumption. The forest industry 
supported two pulp and paper mills, one at Grand Falls (1909), and the other in Corner Brook 
(1925) on the island’s west coast.10  The largest of Newfoundland’s mining operations was at 
Bell Island, where iron ore was extracted.  Other mining enterprises included base metals at 
Buchans and a fl uorspar mine at St. Lawrence.   These operations, however, were small relative 
to mineral development in other areas of the Atlantic region.  Newfoundland’s non-fi shing 
economy began to diversify during World War II, when Canadian and American military bases 
provided thousands of construction jobs and other work for rural Newfoundlanders.  After 
Confederation, opportunities arose particularly in the construction and public works projects, 
mineral development in Labrador as well as the growing service sectors.
While the changes to the economy were occurring gradually, the more dramatic 
transformations in Newfoundland society were in the areas of social welfare and services.11 The 
standard of living rose with the infusion of cash payments to Newfoundland families through 
federal programs such as Family Allowance, Unemployment Insurance and Old Age Pensions. 
The Smallwood government expanded education and developed a regional secondary school 
system outside of St. John’s.  While the denominational character of these schools remained, 
as Noel argues, government infusion of money into education in the years after Confederation 
did make education more accessible, particularly to rural children and working class people 
of St. John’s.12  Post-secondary education, including Memorial University (formerly, it had 
been a non-degree-granting college), trade and vocational training, and a college of fi sheries 
and navigation, all emerged during the 1950s and 1960s.  Health care also received attention, 
and the people of Newfoundland were generally healthier, succumbing to diseases such 
as tuberculosis and diphtheria far less frequently.13  Another major area of change was in 
transportation and communications. The provincial government invested heavily in roads and 
communications, which linked many rural communities both physically and culturally to other 
parts of Newfoundland, and to North America itself.  Indeed, the roads, along with radio and 
later television, would play a large role in transforming popular culture, leading to changes in 
entertainment, local customs and even to local dialects and speech patterns.
Despite these dramatic changes in the way of life for people of Newfoundland during the 
Smallwood years, Newfoundland remained on the margins of North American prosperity. 
While the population of Newfoundland had increased signifi cantly during these years, the 
number of people leaving the province in search of work was high as well, averaging 3-4,000 
per year between 1957 and 1971. 14 Although per capita incomes rose after Confederation, they 
remained low relative to those in other parts of Canada (Appendix A). As well, unemployment 
rates in the province were consistently the highest in the country (Appendix B). Results from 
attempts at diversifying and expanding the industrial and resources sectors were uneven. 
The manufacturing base remained small, and local commercial and retail enterprises met 
considerable competition from larger fi rms from the mainland.  Newfoundland’s natural 
resources, particularly in minerals and forestry, generated revenues, but the people of the 
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provinces received few benefi ts outside a few jobs, as most of the profi ts left the region. 
Employment in the resource sector did not increase substantially, as only 25 percent of the 
labour force found work in fi shing, mining and forestry.15  By the early 1970s, Newfoundland 
was still heavily dependent on transfer payments from Ottawa. 
In trying to understand why Newfoundland experienced these diffi culties  in these post-
Confederation years, a few scholars have examined its political culture and the dominance of 
its fi rst premier, Joseph Smallwood.  S.J.R. Noel, in his analysis of 20th-century Newfoundland 
politics, argues that despite becoming a province, the political culture and attitudes in 
Newfoundland remained similar to what they were before Commission of Government. 16
Denominationalism was still present, along with patronage.  In fact, he sees strong similarities 
between the Squires governments of the 1920s and 1930s with the Smallwood governments of 
the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the drive for resource and industrial development.  Noel 
claims that by the 1960s, the Newfoundland electorate was gaining some political sophistication 
and was better able to understand the distinctions between the jurisdictions of the federal and 
provincial governments (he notes that Smallwood intentionally tried to blur the lines).  The 
local party structures, however, remained weak in the 1960s, he claims, as Smallwood still 
retained strong personal infl uence over local riding associations and the Liberal Party itself.  At 
the time Noel’s book was published (1971), Smallwood was still clinging to power, and Noel 
was looking forward to the broadening and maturing of Newfoundland politics.
Historian Peter Neary, in his analysis of politics in Newfoundland during the Smallwood 
years, also noted that strong, locally-based democratic practices and values did not emerge 
in the province immediately after Confederation.17   He argued that from 1949 to 1957, 
the major development in Newfoundland politics was the rise to power and infl uence of 
Smallwood.  In particular, Neary detailed Smallwood’s personal control over not only both 
federal and provincial Liberal party machinery, but also the way he seemed to take personal 
credit for federal programs coming from Ottawa.  Neary suggested that Smallwood was able 
to do this, partly because of his considerable speaking and persuasion skills, as well as the 
public’s continued identifi cation of the opposition Conservatives with the anti-Confederation 
campaign.  Neary also argued that Smallwood was able to centralize power because the people 
of Newfoundland, to that point, had not had a lot of experience with democratic institutions. 
Years of Commission of Government, along with the absence of local government and few 
municipalities, meant that many people expected politics to work that way.  Neary says that 
Smallwood was able maintain his, and the Liberal party’s  hold over Newfoundland politics 
during the period from 1957 and 1968, despite the election in 1957 of the Diefenbaker 
Conservatives in Ottawa.  Although left without his “direct line” to the federal cabinet during 
the Diefenbaker years, Smallwood was still able to rally support in the province.
By the late 1960s, however, Smallwood’s political power and infl uence had been undermined, 
partly by increasing economic and fi nancial crises in the province.  It was becoming clear that 
development strategies which relied on outside capital had failed to diversify the economy and 
reduce dependence on the fi shery for employment.  Neary argued that the Canadian version of 
federalism, which had left responsibility for economic development to the provinces, played 
a role in Newfoundland’s inability to take greater control over its resources and the way they 
were exploited.   He suggested, “The capital for an alternative strategy of public ownership and 
development might have been mobilized by the federal government but this course was never 
contemplated either in St. John’s or Ottawa.”18  Instead, Newfoundland’s economy continued 
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to decline, while the value of the minerals and hydro-electric power shipped out of the 
province rose.  Neary argued that “What Newfoundland’s post-Confederation history perhaps 
demonstrated above all else was how a decentralized federalism facilitated the progress of 
foreign capital in Canada.”19
The fi gure of Smallwood himself and his politics and development strategies has, not 
surprisingly, attracted considerable attention in the popular political literature.  Journalist 
Richard Gwyn, as well as former political colleagues of Smallwood,  Harold Horwood and 
Harold Pottle, have each offered their opinions on the often contradictory, enigmatic premier.20
Gwyn, writing while Smallwood was still in offi ce, portrays the man as a dynamic, enterprising 
man, obsessed with power and progress, who, despite his fl aws, brought about a “revolution” in 
Newfoundland society (hence the title of his book: Smallwood: The Unlikely Revolutionary). 
Horwood, writing in the 1980s, saw Smallwood’s vision for Newfoundland as dated, a relic 
of the 19th, not the 20th century.  He portrays Smallwood as increasingly being corrupted by 
his own power.  Herbert Pottle, a former Minister of Public Works in the fi rst Smallwood 
government who later spent his career in education and social welfare in Newfoundland, was 
particularly critical of Smallwood and his vision for Newfoundland.  He claims that in the 
two decades following Confederation, Smallwood sacrifi ced long-term social, educational and 
economic development for projects offering short-term political rewards.  In the process, he 
argues, the people of Newfoundland remained dependent on government and never had the 
opportunity to grow politically, to gain political understanding and awareness.
While each of Smallwood’s biographers had their own opinions on the Newfoundland 
politician’s strengths and weaknesses, a few aspects of his personality and background provide 
some insights into the way he governed the province in these years.  Smallwood was clearly 
a man who came to the premier’s role without any political or administrative experience.  He 
was primarily self-educated and he tended to view the world, the economy and politics in fairly 
simplistic terms. At the same time, however, he was a very persuasive man, enthusiastic, and 
eternally optimistic about his abilities to solve problems, whether they be building enough 
roads to rural communities, to stopping out-migration through major employment schemes. 
Perhaps we should not be surprised at his seeming naivete in putting so much faith in some 
of the more outlandish development projects.  Herbert Pottle argued that Smallwood was an 
exceptional promoter, well-suited to lead the Confederation forces in 1948, but was ill-suited to 
the role of running the new province.  However, the question remains if another more capable 
politician in the premier’s chair would have been able to make a difference.
While Smallwood continues to raise debate and questions, historian Raymond Blake has 
looked more closely at the role of the federal government in integrating Newfoundland as a 
province in the fi rst decade of Confederation.21  He argues that despite the logistical diffi culties 
of sorting out new roles and procedure, the move was relatively smooth, made easier by the 
infusion of federal social welfare programs into rural communities.  For example, Blake noted 
that the federal government quietly set up the framework to administer the Family Allowance 
program shortly after the Terms of Union were signed, to ensure that people could receive 
cheques as quickly as possible.22  Blake claims that by the end of 1955, Newfoundland 
families had received $65 million in Family Allowance benefi ts.  Likewise, the federal 
government created a temporary program to enable workers in Newfoundland to qualify for 
the Unemployment Insurance program.  Since Newfoundland workers had not yet contributed 
to the national program and did not qualify for benefi ts under the normal rules, the federal 
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government contributed funds to allow them to collect if they became unemployed.  In the 
fi rst year after Confederation, the federal government paid $3.2 million in Unemployment 
Insurance benefi ts to Newfoundland workers.  Indeed, Blake claims the number of recipients 
swelled in the fi rst few years after Confederation when Smallwood created a number of 
public-works projects specifi cally to enable Newfoundland workers to qualify for the federal 
program.  While the Old Age Pensions took longer to implement because of the need for new 
provincial legislation, people qualifying for the program in Newfoundland saw their pensions 
rise from $72 a year to $30 a month.  All in all, in the fi rst few years after Confederation, the 
federal government was contributing $24 million annually to Newfoundlanders through the 
Family Allowance, the Unemployment Insurance program, and the Old Age Pensions.
While Blake argues the federal government fulfi lled its obligations in extending social 
welfare programs to the people of Newfoundland, it was reluctant to provide support in the 
area of economic development.23  The Association of Newfoundland Industries Limited, 
which represented the manufacturing sector, asked the Newfoundland delegation negotiating 
the Terms of Union with Canada for tax concessions and other assistance to help them make 
the transition. Blake notes that the secondary manufacturing sector in Newfoundland was 
small, but it did provide 4,000 people with jobs and relatively cheap consumer goods for 
the local market.  Newfoundland manufacturers had been protected from competition from 
Canadian good through a protective tariff.  In 1949, those tariffs would disappear, leaving 
the approximately 130 companies vulnerable to dumping of products by larger Canadian 
fi rms.  As well, taxes would increase and Newfoundland manufacturers would have to switch 
from American to Canadian suppliers of raw materials such as steel.  The negotiating team, 
however, failed to heed the request.  As well, after Confederation, the federal Minister of 
Trade and Commerce, C.D. Howe, refused to give special consideration to Newfoundland 
manufacturers, believing that the government could not treat manufacturers in one Canadian 
province differently from another.  Furthermore, local manufacturing was a provincial, not a 
federal responsibility.  Blake argues that in the short term, 18 Newfoundland manufacturing 
companies, mostly in the area of garment-making, boot and shoe production, mattresses and 
tobacco, were unable to compete with Canadian fi rms and closed.  On the other hand, however, 
some Newfoundland enterprises were able to withstand the competition, and took steps to 
improve both the quality and price of their goods.
Another issue of concern for the manufacturing industry, and in particular, the resource 
sector, was whether or not the Canadian government would allow foreign-owned companies 
in Newfoundland to retain tax breaks they had secured before Confederation.24  The Bowaters 
pulp and paper operation, which was British-owned, were paying considerably lower taxes in 
Newfoundland than they would under the Canadian tax laws (Bowaters paid $150,000 annually 
before Confederation. Under Canadian tax law, the company would have to pay approximately 
$1 million annually).  While the chairman of the company, Sir Eric Bowater, lobbied the 
Newfoundland delegation negotiating the terms of union, his efforts had few results.
Blake concludes that in many ways, the transition to provincial status for Newfoundland 
was successful.25  Federal social services extended to the people of Newfoundland helped 
improve the standard of living by raising monthly cash incomes.  As well, the dropping of 
trade barriers with Canada and competition with mainland goods led to a reduction in prices 
for consumer goods.  On the other hand, however, neither Confederation nor the continuing 
relationship with the federal government was able to erase economic problems in the new 
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province.  Blake argues that the limitations of the Terms of Union (specifi cally the lack of 
attention to assistance in economic matters) as well as the federal government’s reluctance to 
provide help to Newfoundland’s economy in the post-Confederation years, contributed to the 
province’s inability to become prosperous.
While the politics of Newfoundland provides a starting point for an understanding of 
post-Confederation society, other scholars have looked more broadly at social and economic 
issues in this period.  Some of the fi rst academic studies on Newfoundland’s economy and 
society during these years came from scholars, primarily anthropologists, sociologists and 
ethnographers from Europe and the United States who studied rural communities in the early 
1960s.26  These academics, who were funded by the newly-formed Institute of Social and 
Economic Research at Memorial University, conducted fi eldwork in Newfoundland’s outports 
and later wrote a series of community studies.27  Much of this work was informed by variations 
of “modernization theory,” which offered a dualistic model of economic development 
consisting of “traditional” and “modern” societies.28  According to this model, “traditional” 
societies were characterized by labour intensiveness, occupational pluralism, with low levels 
of technology, entrepreneurship and capital.  Conversely, “modern” societies were innovative, 
highly capitalized with high levels of technology and an educated and specialized workforce. 
Believing that they were witnessing the shift from a pre-industrial, simple, autonomous society 
untouched by modern values to an industrial society, these scholars found Newfoundland an 
interesting “social laboratory.”  This modernization model has been criticized, however, for 
focussing on internal factors such as technology and entrepreneurship, but ignoring other 
factors in social and economic change such as capital structures and class relations, gender and 
race relations, colonialism and other unequal power relationships.  Later social theorists also 
argued that the model was static and ahistorical and did not adequately explain why and how 
change occurred.  While these early community studies looked at changes occurring in this 
period, many failed to place these changes within a wider historical context.   Nevertheless, 
these studies provided some insights into these communities in the 1960s and infl uenced later 
work.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, scholars turned their attention to the impact 
of federal and provincial social and economic policies after Confederation.29   One of the more 
visible manifestations of state intervention in Newfoundland society was the resettlement 
program.  In the years following Confederation, thousands of people living in small fi shing 
communities migrated into larger centres, some on their own, and others through government-
sponsored programs.  In the 1950s and early 1960s, in a move to reduce costs of providing 
services to smaller outports, the Newfoundland government provided fi nancial assistance 
for those willing to move to larger centres.  Beginning in 1965, the provincial government 
entered into a joint program with the federal government to encourage applicants to move 
to designated “growth centres” instead of being allowed to move to a community of their 
choice.  This program was loosely based on the “growth pole theory” which was current in 
regional development policy in the 1960s and early 1970s.30  It assumed that development 
concentrated in specifi c centres would generate further development, through economic spin-
offs and spread effects.  While the program generated some controversy among the population, 
thousands of people moved. By the early 1970s, there were some 200 fewer rural communities 
in Newfoundland than there had been at Confederation.
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Some scholars who examined this period in Newfoundland lauded these efforts, whereas 
others questioned both the effi cacy, and the motivations of the government, as well as the 
underlying causes for regional disparity.  Sociologists Noel Iverson and Ralph Matthews 
argued that the program did not provide enough support for those making the transition, and 
most had trouble fi nding work in the designated “growth centres.”31  Indeed, they argued that 
many resettled fi shing people ended up having to return to their former communities to fi sh, 
as they had little means of earning a living in their new homes.  More recently, anthropologist 
John C. Kennedy has made similar arguments about the resettlement experience for people 
of southeastern Labrador.  Between 1967 and 1970, one quarter of the population of the area 
moved to designated centres, mostly Cartwright and Mary’s Harbour. 32  People agreed to 
move, partly for economic reasons (the cod fi shery was declining in the late 1960s) and partly 
to obtain better education for their children.  The results, however, were mixed, as many 
resettled families returned to their summer fi shing grounds throughout the 1970s.  Many also 
lost access to winter resources, including hunting and trapping due to local competition for 
these resources in their new communities.  Resettlement also created social divisions within 
the designated centres, as “new” residents often lived separately from the “old” residents. 
Conversely, Parzival Copes, a researcher who came to Memorial University in the 1960s, 
defended the resettlement program.33  He supported the removal of people from outport 
communities  because he believed that the fi shery, the primary occupation of people of rural 
Newfoundland, had limited potential for economic growth.  He maintained that profi t could 
be made only by increasing the volume of the catch, and he thought the supply could only 
support a small workforce.  Catching fi sh from small boats was ineffi cient, he claimed, and 
could be done more effectively through centralized operations, using offshore trawlers.   He 
believed that the fi shery was not capable of supporting a growing population, and resettlement, 
he claimed, was the only solution.  Not only did he think that the resettlement program was 
worthwhile, but he thought it did not go far enough in encouraging people to leave.  Indeed, 
he argued that the government should be encouraging people to leave the province itself, not 
just the fi shery.  Copes’ views were controversial, yet the accusation that there were “too many 
fi shermen catching too few fi sh” has been a common refrain among federal fi sheries analysts 
and other critics of the inshore fi shery in the years since.  Copes’ arguments, however, made 
the assumption that sheer volume was the only answer to developing the fi shery.  At the time 
that Copes was writing, most of Newfoundland’s frozen fi sh was sold in large blocks, then sent 
to the United States where it received further processing.  It was in this  “value-added” step of 
processing where the profi ts on frozen fi sh were generally made.
Other scholars, however, were beginning to offer broader critiques of the development 
policies of the post-Confederation years, and interpretations on the reasons for regional 
disparity.  Infl uenced by Marxist-based theories of capitalist underdevelopment of marginal 
regions as well as “dependency” theorists of Latin America, they looked to the wider economic 
and capitalist structures of the area.  The work of Henry Veltmeyer, Steven Antler, and Ellen 
Antler, among others, examined the class structure, rather than local geographic or resource 
issues, to explain regional poverty.34  Ellen Antler and James Faris, in their study of a resettled 
community on the northeast coast of Newfoundland, claim that the social and economic policies 
of the federal and provincial governments in these years were motivated to create a  “reserve 
army” of labour.35 Seeing the state as catering to the demands of large-scale capital, Antler 
and Faris argue that the resettlement program was an example of an attempt to proletarianize 
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the labour force, to reduce attachments to the fi shery so that labour would be free for work on 
either the mainland, or shorter-term construction projects such as the Churchill Falls hydro-
electric development.  While this analysis fails to explain why governments would go to such 
lengths when labour needs were relatively small in the region, and were adequately served on 
the mainland, the work did generate interest in the broader questions about capital structures 
and regional poverty.
Other scholars, who were also infl uenced by the “dependency” theorists but who paid 
closer attention to the historical specifi city of the region also tried to understand the failure of 
Newfoundland to thrive economically in the two decades following Confederation, included 
historian David Alexander and sociologist Ralph Matthews.  Alexander, in an infl uential 
article “Development and Dependence in Newfoundland, 1880-1970,” argued that lack 
of resources or comparative locational advantage did not cause Newfoundland’s poverty. 
Instead, he suggested that Newfoundland had adequate resources and talent to prosper, but that 
poor management, and an inability to defend its interests against wealthier regions hindered 
development.36  He also faulted the local entrepreneurial elites for failing to take opportunities 
that would have led to a stronger local economy.  Alexander claimed Newfoundland suffered 
from trying too much to imitate the industrial model of central Canada, a tactic which leads to 
the peripheral region achieving only  “a shabby dignity or a shabby replica of what exists in 
the heartland.”37  Instead, he suggested that areas such as Newfoundland must fi nd their own, 
unique path to development, using a strategy that builds upon the strengths and advantages of 
the region.
Ralph Matthews, while sharing Alexander’s beliefs that Smallwood’s post-Confederation 
development projects contributed to regional dependency, argued that Newfoundland 
nevertheless posed considerable challenges to anyone trying to fi nd a way to provide 
employment and services to its population. 38  The population in Newfoundland grew rapidly 
in the post-war years, rising from 361,416 in 1951 to 457,853 by 1966.  Over 40 per cent of 
the 1951 population was classifi ed as urban, concentrated mainly on the Avalon Peninsula 
and the Humber Valley.  However, the rural inhabitants were scattered widely along the 
thousands of miles of coastline. These demographic and geographic features  made it diffi cult 
for government to deliver basic services such as education and health care.  As well, the 
distance from major markets, and the high rates of illiteracy in Newfoundland (twice the 
national average), despite the growth of the education system, provided major impediments 
to social and economic development.  While Matthews credits Smallwood for transforming 
rural Newfoundland through roads, schools and mass communication, Smallwood’s attempts 
at economic development only deepened the economic weakness of the area.  Matthews 
acknowledged that the Smallwood government had little choice in relying on outside capital 
for large-scale resource development projects.  In doing so, however, the province gave up 
valuable long-term benefi ts from the resources for short-term employment, such as in the case 
with Churchill Falls power development.  Matthews was highly critical of the Smallwood 
government’s rural policy, which focussed on resettlement, rather than actually trying to make 
the rural economy stronger.  He suggested that focussing on small and medium-scale projects, 
using local resources for local consumption, would provide greater benefi ts (and be less costly) 
than the “mega-projects” favoured by the Smallwood governments.  Matthews noted that: 
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Few small societies ever have the opportunity to alter their economic history 
completely and move from economic dependency to self-suffi ciency. 
Whether or not Smallwood’s government was given that opportunity in 1949 
will always be a matter of conjecture. By 1972, however, its dependency was 
so severe that self-suffi ciency no longer seemed possible.39
Matthews believed that Newfoundland entered Confederation with severe handicaps, 
including isolation and illiteracy.  While the two decades following 1949 did reduce some 
of these problems, Smallwood’s development policies ended up benefi ting outside capital at 
the expense of the people of Newfoundland, who receive few returns on the mass export of 
minerals and hydro-electric power.
Although Smallwood and the provincial government were largely alone in their attempts 
to bring industries to Newfoundland in the 1950s, the federal government initiated a wider 
program of regional economic development in the Atlantic provinces in the 1960s.40  The 
1957 Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects, chaired by Walter Gordon, 
recommended that the federal government turn its attention to supporting the economies 
of economically weak areas of the country, including the Atlantic region.  The Diefenbaker 
government introduced the fi rst of several programs aimed at developing agricultural areas in 
the Atlantic provinces.  Newfoundland, however, received little of this federal funding until 
the end of the 1960s, when Ottawa created the Department of Regional Economic Expansion 
(DREE).  Like the earlier federal-provincial resettlement program, DREE loosely employed 
“growth pole theory” to designate “special areas” for development.  Unlike the agricultural 
programs of the early 1960s, DREE focussed primarily on urban and industrial development, 
and provided infrastructure assistance, incentives to private enterprise, educational and 
technological support.  DREE embarked on these projects, sharing the costs with provincial 
governments.  In Newfoundland, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, St. John’s received many 
of the DREE projects, including an industrial park, new water and sewage systems, a new high 
school and an engineering building for Memorial University.
As both Ralph Matthews and sociologist Donald Savoie have noted, however, DREE 
came under attack fairly early in the program.41  Critics argued that the Liberal government 
favoured its own supporters in awarding grants and incentives to private enterprise.  Provincial 
governments complained that they had little infl uence on policies created by the highly-
centralized DREE organization.  Concerns were also raised about the heavy emphasis on 
infrastructure at the expense of other types of projects.  As well, the Newfoundland government 
was afraid that companies receiving incentives to set up operations in Atlantic Canada would 
choose Halifax over St. John’s.   After several years of the program, few saw any signs that 
DREE had made a difference in alleviating regional inequalities.   The department underwent 
several structural and organizational changes in the 1970s, before fi nally being disbanded at 
the end of the decade.
Strains in the federal-provincial relationship were also evident in fi sheries issues after 
Confederation.  When Newfoundland became part of Canada, responsibility for sea fi sheries 
transferred to Ottawa.  Several scholars have tried to understand the implications of this event, 
as well as the broader fi sheries development agendas of the post-Confederation years.  One 
of the most infl uential works on this period was David Alexander’s The Decay of Trade: 
An Economic History of the Newfoundland Saltfi sh Trade, 1935-1965.42  Alexander saw 
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the collapse of what was once the world’s largest saltfi sh-producing economy as a major 
blow to the viability of the Newfoundland’s fi shery in the 20th century.  He acknowledged 
that by the time the Great Depression sent saltfi sh prices spiralling downward, the saltfi sh 
economy in Newfoundland needed help in the form of new investment, processing methods, 
organization and marketing.  While he believed that the Commission of Government’s creation 
of a marketing body, Newfoundland Association of Fish Exporters’s Limited (NAFEL) after 
World War II was a promising step, Alexander argued that the organization was never able 
to surmount the larger problems experienced in the trade.  Marketing and currency exchange 
diffi culties in post-war Europe, the inability to deal with quality and production problems, the 
movement of local fi sh merchants out of the business were certainly contributing to the decline 
of the sector.
Alexander, however, was particularly critical of the federal government and its apparent 
lack of interest in revitalizing the saltfi sh trade.   Alexander remarked that “The saltfi sh trade 
was never regarded as a jewel in the crown of the federal Department of Fisheries.”43  Indeed, 
in the post-Confederation years, both federal and provincial governments favoured supporting 
the frozen fi sh sector, believing that its industrial structure and markets in the United States 
offered a more secure future for the fi shing economy.  Alexander, however, saw potential for 
the saltfi sh economy, arguing that with market development, research in saltfi sh production 
methods and products, greater interest from local fi shing companies, and the commitment of 
the government, the saltfi sh economy may have been restored.  The fact that the frozen fi sh 
industry failed to offer the economic security it initially promised suggested to Alexander that 
developing the saltfi sh sector may have lessened Newfoundland’s dependence on Ottawa for 
support.  Alexander claims that instead, “the fi shery resource was abandoned to other countries, 
the economic development of the province was seriously weakened; and a modest little trade 
with the United States was substituted for the restoration of Newfoundland’s historic role as 
a major world fi shing nation.  Both Newfoundland and Canada lost in the process.”44   While 
Alexander perhaps overestimated the ability of the fi shing industry and even the Canadian 
government to deal with the larger problems that occurred in the post-World War II years, he 
certainly raised important questions about decisions made regarding fi sheries development by 
the state.
Indeed, more recently, Miriam Wright has examined the role of the state in supporting the 
industrial, frozen fi sh sector in the post-World War II years in her book, A Fishery for Modern 
Times: The State and The Industrialization of the Newfoundland Fishery, 1934-1968.45  She 
argues that state planners and politicians supported the industrial fi shery, partly because it 
seemed to solve some of the production and marketing diffi culties in the industry, and partly 
because it seemed to represent a “modern” model of development.  In the post-World War II 
years, currents in thinking on economic and social development suggested that the path to 
prosperity was through technology, centralization, industrialization and professionalization 
(this was a variant on “modernization theory,” similar to the social models used by the 
anthropologists who fi rst studied Newfoundland communities in the 1960s).  Planners and 
politicians believed that “modernizing” (i.e. industrializing) the fi shery was a necessary part 
of the wider transformation of Newfoundland society and culture in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Wright argues that this profound faith in the ability of “modernization” to solve social and 
economic problems in outport Newfoundland blinded at least some politicians to other models 
of development that were more community-based and less capital intensive. 
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Initially, the Smallwood government provided most of the funding for fi sheries 
“modernization,” which involved providing loans to private operators to build frozen fi sh 
processing plants and trawlers.  Although a joint federal-provincial commission on fi sheries 
development in the early 1950s suggested that Ottawa and St. John’s work together on a larger 
fi sheries program, the federal government ultimately declined to support such a venture. 
Arguing that they could not provide funds for economic development to one province and 
not another, the federal government instead supported “modernization” indirectly, through 
research and technological development programs.  
By the 1960s, however, conditions in the fi shery had changed rapidly with the rise of 
European distant-water fl eets which began fi shing off the coast of Newfoundland.  Between 
the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, the total catch of cod off the coast of Newfoundland tripled. 
This increased fi shing effort began to have an impact on inshore and offshore fi sh landings in 
Newfoundland.  Although the federal government’s extension of the Unemployment Insurance 
program to include fi shers in the late 1950s had made fi shing incomes more stable, many 
inshore fi shers were having trouble surviving in this new environment.  In the early 1960s, the 
Smallwood government began pressuring the federal government to provide more assistance to 
the Newfoundland fi shery.  Although it declined to take part in a wider fi sheries development 
proposal submitted by the Newfoundland government, the federal government did begin to take 
a more interventionist role in the fi shery.  It made several (unsuccessful) attempts at limiting 
foreign offshore fi shing by extending the fi shing limit (the territorial limit was only three 
miles until it was extended to 12 miles in 1969).  As well, the federal Department of Fisheries 
began to offer subsidies for trawlers and larger vessels used in the inshore fi shery.  These 
measures, however, were unable to alleviate some of the larger problems in the Newfoundland 
(and Atlantic) fi shery in this period.  Severe declines in landings in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, as well as glutting in the American markets which kept prices low, made surviving 
in the fi shery diffi cult.  Over the long term, approaches to development which focussed on 
intensifying industrial capacity in the fi shery contributed to the devastation of the resource in 
the 1980s and 1990s.
Sociologist Peter Sinclair has also examined the changes in the fi shery in the post-World 
War II years, focussing on the impact of state policies, both federal and provincial, on the 
social relations of the fi shery at the community level. 46 In particular, he looks at the way that 
government policies have affected fi sheries management, the capital accumulation process 
and maintaining fi sheries incomes through loan programs, Unemployment Insurance and other 
forms of assistance.  Sinclair notes how inshore fi shing communities were transformed in 
these years, as the saltfi sh trade gave way to frozen fi sh, and small-scale, domestic commodity 
production (as he terms small boat owners) became tied to the frozen fi sh companies.  While 
domestic commodity production continued to co-exist with a centralized, highly capitalized 
industrial fi shery, community and work relations in fi shing communities were altered with 
the rise of an intermediate-scale fi shing enterprise –  the longliner or dragger (decked vessels 
typically between 35 and 60 feet in length -- larger than the typical inshore boats which are 
usually less than 35 feet) beginning in the 1960s.  Not only were these operations more 
expensive (usually supported through government loan programs and subsidies) but they led 
to more social distinctions between captain/owner and crew, and between the owners of the 
larger vessels and the small-boat fi shers.  Social relations in the fi shery were also changed in 
these years with the beginnings of labour organization within the fi shery, fi rst in fi sh plants 
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(early to mid-1960s), then among inshore fi shers (late 1960s and early 1970s) and offshore 
trawler crews (early 1970s).47
Social and economic changes in the fi shery in the 1950s and 1960s also had an impact on 
the historical role of women in Newfoundland’s fi shing economy.  Women’s labour had been 
central to the household-based, saltfi sh-producing inshore fi shery since the rise of the resident 
fi shery in the early 19th century. 48 Women contributed to the household’s survival, not only 
through producing items for their families’ consumption such as gardening, berry-picking, 
cloth and clothing making, childcare and food preparation, but also through drying and curing 
the fi sh which their fathers, husbands and sons produced.  Women’s level of involvement in 
the fi shery varied across time and place, depending on the local organization and seasonality 
of the inshore fi shery, and the particular uses of technology.  Women living in Bank fi shing 
communities, for example, cured fi sh for the local Bank fi shery merchant, rather than their 
own families.  As Marilyn Porter and Hilda Chaulk Murray argue, women’s roles as “skipper 
of the shore crew” gave them some autonomy within their sphere, and the respect of the 
community.  These women existed, however, within a patriarchal framework, and their access 
to the fi shing economy was through their fathers and husbands.  Women who did not marry, 
or were widowed, lacked the economic security of the “shore skippers” who were typically 
married to boat-owning fi shers.  Young, unmarried women who “shipped out” or worked as 
domestic servants in the households of others, performing both household and fi shery-related 
tasks found themselves in a more precarious position, socially and economically.
As the fi shery began to change in the post-World War II years, with the transition from 
household production of salted fi sh to centralized processing in frozen fi sh plants, women’s 
relationship to the fi shery also altered.  Women gradually stopped curing saltfi sh as fi shers 
began selling their fi sh fresh to freezing plants.  Some found work in these plants, where they 
were available.  Others, however, relied on government programs that brought cash into rural 
households, including Family Allowance cheques, Pensions and Unemployment Insurance.  
While Ellen Antler portrayed this separation of production from the household as part of 
the “proletarianization” of the labour force in rural Newfoundland,49 Barbara Neis interpreted 
women’s changing relationship to the fi shery as a shift from familial to social patriarchy.50  She 
argues that women moved from being part of a household-based patriarchal structure in the 
household saltfi sh enterprise to a situation where they were more dependent on the state and 
corporate structures - themselves imbued with gender ideology.  Miriam Wright has noted the 
gender ideology that was an integral part of the fi sheries “modernization” policies in the 1950s 
and 1960s, which assumed that women would be “liberated” from their work curing fi sh and 
that they would play a minimal role in the modern fi shing economy.51  Neis notes that initially, 
the changes in the fi shing economy and society gave women some independence from the 
household patriarchy, by offering waged work at the fi sh plants (in most areas of the province, 
this work remained seasonal) and access to a state social welfare system.  The cumulative 
effect of new policies, including Unemployment Insurance and minimum wage laws, however, 
made women more dependent on both the state and the fi shing incomes of their husbands. 
The Unemployment Insurance program for fi shers introduced in the late 1950s failed to 
recognize women’s labour in the production of salted fi sh.  Only men received “stamps” or 
credit for delivering saltfi sh to local merchants, even if women did the preparation and curing. 
Although women only rarely fi shed with their husbands, the women who did were not eligible 
for Unemployment Insurance benefi ts.  The program stipulated that when a fi sherman’s wife 
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worked as a member of the crew, and they sold their fi sh fresh (not dried) that the woman’s 
share went to her husband and he received “stamps” based on their combined catch.  Likewise, 
minimum wage laws allowed employers to pay female employees less than male workers, even 
if performing the same job.  Women eventually organized and fought to change some of these 
policies, including the minimum wage law (1974) and the regulation in the Unemployment 
Insurance program which denied benefi ts to women who fi shed with their husbands (1981). 
Clearly, however, the transition from saltfi sh to frozen fi sh, and the separation of production 
from the household in the 1950s and the 1960s affected men and women differently.
While this paper has surveyed the scholarship on Newfoundland society from Confederation 
to 1972, the literature is still far from complete.  Many questions remain about the Smallwood 
government, the impact of the resettlement program, women, aboriginal peoples, Labrador 
communities, resource development and fi shing communities, among others.  Nevertheless, 
looking at this literature does highlight some of the ongoing problems that Newfoundland, as 
a new province in Canada, faced in the fi rst few decades.  Many of these problems have had 
long-term consequences, some of which we still see today.  First, it is clear that Newfoundland 
entered Confederation with some considerable challenges, including a fi shing economy 
weakened by decades of neglect, a highly scattered population who had not had the benefi t of 
a comprehensive education system.  As well, as both Noel and Neary have noted, traditions 
of local democratic institutions and practices were not strong and it took decades before 
the people of Newfoundland were able to develop local democratic political organizations. 
This situation made it easy for one person, Smallwood, to maintain control over not only his 
own caucus and government, but both federal and provincial wings of the Liberal party.  So, 
Newfoundland began its life as a province of Canada with diffi culties.
Newfoundland also had considerable challenges in trying to deliver the promises of 
confederation.  As Raymond Blake pointed out, the federal government quickly extended 
its social welfare programs to the people of Newfoundland quickly, but was reluctant to 
provide any support for economic development. Indeed, in the 1950s, the federal government 
continued to insist that economic development, whether it was the fi shery or other natural 
resources or manufacturing, was a provincial responsibility.  That left the problem, of course, 
of how a small province with limited fi nances could provide more employment for its people 
and make use of its mineral, hydro-electric, forest and marine resources.  Smallwood opted for 
following an industrial model based on the mainland, and invited outside capital to develop 
these resource industries.  While this strategy provided short-term employment opportunities, 
it was these outside companies, over the long term, who reaped the benefi ts of getting access 
to these resources.  As Alexander and Matthews, among others have pointed out, alternative 
models of development that might have taken advantage of Newfoundland’s strengths in local 
resources and skills, never featured in offi cial plans for the province.
By the mid-1960s, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the development strategies 
were not working as anticipated.  The federal government, which was slowly increasing its 
level of intervention in regional economies, took some steps to help alleviate problems in 
the area.  It joined with the Smallwood government in planning and implementing a massive 
household resettlement program, aimed at reducing people’s attachment to the fi shery.  While 
some communities gladly accepted the opportunity to move, for many others, the poorly-
conceived attempt at “social engineering” failed to provide them with a new livelihood.  The 
other major area of federal intervention in local economic development in the 1960s were 
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the regional development programs, of which DREE was the most visible.  Apart from a few 
infrastructure programs, primarily in the existing urban areas, the impact on Newfoundland 
was negligible.  Indeed, at the end of Smallwood’s years in offi ce, Newfoundland was still 
heavily dependent on transfer payments from Ottawa.
While it is diffi cult to apply lessons from the successes or failures of development 
approaches of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s directly to the present, a study of this literature 
does reveal a few valuable insights.  Although no one would seriously propose to resurrect the 
resettlement program, the overly-ambitious plan of the 1960s illustrates the folly of trying to 
use simplistic approaches to solve complex social and economic problems.  David Alexander 
questioned the assumption that “successful” economies have to follow the same path as those 
of other industrialized regions.  Newfoundland had a wealth of resources and some unique 
products, but a lack of control over those resources, and the attempts to copy industrial 
development of central Canada did little to bring economic stability to the province.  Likewise, 
Ralph Matthews questioned the tendency to put too much faith in “mega-projects” in building 
the economy, instead of looking for ways to use the existing strengths, resources and skills of 
Newfoundland on a more modest scale.  Similar conclusions could be drawn from the studies 
of post-Confederation fi sheries development and policies.  As well, the research on women in 
the fi shery suggests that we need to be aware that economic development and policies have 
different implications for men and women.   Although the last quarter of the twentieth century 
brought many more changes still to Newfoundland, an awareness of paths travelled in the fi rst 
few decades after Confederation may help us better understand how we arrived at the present.
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Appendix A          
Earned Income, Per Capita
Relation to National Average (Canada=100)
1961 1966 1971
Newfoundland 53.2 52.5 54.8
Nova Scotia 75.0 71.5 74.2
Ontario 121.1 118.3 119.2
Source: Donald Savoie, Regional Economic Development: Canada’s Search for Solutions, 2nd




Relation to National Average (Canada = 100)
1961 1966 1971
Newfoundland 275 171 135
Nova Scotia 114 138 113
Ontario 77 76 87
Source: Donald Savoie, Regional Economic Development: Canada’s Search for Solutions, 2nd
ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 193 (Statistics Canada, The Labour Force, 
71-001)         
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